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GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
THEORY AND METHOD 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2014) 
Reviewed by Jacques Vanderlinden∗ 
This is not a review in an ordinary sense of the word, i.e.: “7. a. 
A general account or criticism of a literary work (esp. a new or 
recent one) …”1 or, according to Geoffrey Samuel, “a critical piece 
aimed at the public on a particular book by a particular author”.2 
Comparing (or is it juxtaposing?) these definitions, they include a 
common idea behind a radical: the review must be “critic-al.” Here 
I am, sent back to my Shorter English Concise Dictionary in two 
volumes, which gives me no solace, as the first two definitions—
apparently the most relevant—imply a judgment, even if it is a 
“careful” one. To pass a judgment on anyone or anything is 
something I intensely dislike. My first reaction was indeed to send 
the book back to the Journal, as it was so completely 
overwhelming me.  
At the same time, it attracted me irresistibly as, due to my 
limited knowledge, I was willing to agree that it was “the single 
(my underlining) introductory work exclusively devoted to 
comparative law methodology” (at back cover). Thus I could only 
infer that I had in my hands a rare thing and my curiosity was even 
more awakened than it was permanently by nature.  
                                                                                                             
 ∗  Professor of Law emeritus (Free University of Brussels and University 
of Moncton); Former Secretary General of the International African Law 
Association and of the Société Jean Bodin pour l’Histoire comparative des 
Institutions; Honorary Full Member of the Académie royale des Sciences 
d’Outre-mer; Full Member of the International Academy of Comparative Law; 
Foreign Member of the Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. 
 1. WILLIAM LITTLE, H. W. FOWLER, AND J. COULSON, SHORTER OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (C. T. Onions ed., 1973). 
 2. GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW THEORY 
AND METHOD 26 (European Academy of Legal Theory Series, vol. 11, 2014). 




Further, the book immediately revealed at first sight in some 
places a use of figures; their quality delighted my inner self 
interested in teaching. I personally had rarely been fully satisfied 
by my quasi-total incapacity at concretizing imaginations that 
frequently erupted in my personal work. Finally, why should not 
Geoffrey Samuel’s work provide an answer to questions which 
sometimes appeared to be of paramount importance whenever I 
was confronted with the wish or the obligation to compare a piece 
of law foreign to the one I had been taught at university—if ever 
so—many, many years ago? These were my expectations. They 
certainly contributed to my final decision to embark on this non-
review. All things having been considered with due care, I decided 
accordingly to roam in the book leisurely according to my mood 
and my personal remembrances, leaving to the Editor of the 
Journal the responsibility to incur or not the wrath of the Author 
by publishing or not these pages.  
1. I had an immediate question. Why, in 2014, should one keep 
in the title of such a fundamental and innovative book a reference 
to a “strange,”3 and for me non-existent, topic: “comparative law?” 
Could it not be adequately replaced in English by “comparing 
laws”? Especially since Pierre Legrand—one of, if not, the most 
quoted authors in the book—has for five years proposed replacing 
these two words in French with the more adequate “comparer les 
droits.”4 To which, quite unusually, he added in the title of his 
book, the adverb “résolument,” which leaves me perplexed and of 
which I would dispose easily if I was Samuel. Was he referring to 
his own determination—this is doubtful as he never appeared as 
someone cultivating shyness—or did he only wish his work not to 
be confused too easily (at first sight of course) with that of 
Vanderlinden bearing the same title but for the adverb?5 Let us 
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only hope that Legrand did not imply that the latter was 
irresolute—for whatever it means—in his approach to comparative 
law! Chi lo sa? 
2. Quite quickly I realized that I was confronted with a 
monument of sophistication of which I had no previous idea 
whatsoever. For one more time indeed (but this had happened in 
other branches of law), it came to my mind that I had been for 
decades in the position of Molière’s Mr. Jourdain, comparing 
without knowing what the verb really meant and thus ignoring 
what I was really doing. Since 1953 indeed, when René Dekkers—
then a professor of Roman Law at Brussels Free University—
threw a young student (with two years’ experience at swallowing 
essentially literature in the humanities and trying to reproduce it to 
the letter for two years in June) into the cauldron of the comparison 
of laws by suggesting that he start a thesis devoted to a study of 
codification without any limit throughout space and time, I never, 
never bothered either with methodology or with legal theory 
concerning what I was doing, which I believed was a kind of 
comparison of laws. I was a simple avowed empiricist. Full stop.  
3. Furthermore, I never claimed that any of my publications 
was either a “significant and influential contribution to legal 
knowledge” or “ranked amongst the most elegant and insightful 
contributions” to the same.6 My only excuse for having possibly 
been part of “a tradition in comparative legal writing that can at 
best be described as theoretically weak and at worst startlingly 
trivial,”7 is that, obviously, the book under (non-) review had not 
yet been published, and also that, as Sacco wrote in 1996, any of 
my “proposal[s] could have been richer if [I] had taken advantage 
of the analyses that others had sketched previously.”8 If I was an 
empiricist, the circumstances of my life were such that I rarely had 
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much time to spend on “some serious preliminary reading and 
research” as defined in five lines by C. Hart and adopted by the 
author.9 For some time the necessities of earning a living, followed 
by a huge diversity in my teachings in different places, some of 
them with quasi-inexistent legal documentation, a variety of 
administrative tasks either in faculty or in running international 
associations, and a respectable number of publications which had 
no other pretence than ensuring that I would not perish, certainly 
prevented me from reading the normally required “analyses that 
others had sketched previously.”10 Full stop again.  
4. My only concern today is for the undergraduate student, or 
even the postgraduate one, “whose work involves comparison 
between legal systems”11 or who should have reached that stage in 
his studies in order “to look beyond law as a discipline”12 and to 
take a course in comparative law. He has first to reassess and 
master what law is (i.e. being able to choose between, in 
alphabetical order, Dworkin, Hart and Kelsen, among others) 
before being “introduced” to comparative law by the author, even 
if “the concerns of the comparatist are different” of those of the 
legal theorist.13 My concern is also for all those—far more 
numerous—who are apparently excluded from the magic kingdom 
where law is being compared. I have, of course, been one of them, 
whenever I erred in accordance with the rule model (or any other) 
without knowing of the existence of the latter, or even of what law 
truly is since the Humanists (by the way, who are they?). Clearly 
this “introduction” is conceived—and again this is a choice which 
lies within the complete freedom of the author—for a self-
proclaimed intellectual elite and this (non-)review should never 
have been entrusted to me. And yet, I am fascinated by the book, 
as it deals with two words (although I would have preferred the 
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following three: comparison of laws) with which I have been 
familiar for slightly more than half a century.  
5. This fascination is tinged with some regrets as my own 
experience has been mostly outside the limits that the author—and 
again this is his privilege—has assigned to his work. He seems to 
deal most not with “law” as such, but with laws as they developed 
in Western Europe and spread in the academic world around the 
globe from the Renaissance onwards, i.e. the ones he mentions 
when presenting the rule model: “a matter of propositional 
knowledge expressed in symbols (natural language) themselves 
conforming to a system (linguistic) and thus being capable of 
treatment and manipulation, to a greater or lesser extent depending 
upon the system, by logical operations. It is this logical aspect of 
propositional knowledge that has traditionally inspired jurists since 
the Humanists to construct ever more coherent systems based on 
analogy between law and mathematics.”14 There we are.  
6. This definition clearly has a merit which is too rarely met 
among comparatists: being careful that things compared are 
comparable. Dworkin, Hart and Kelsen may differ as to what 
exactly they consider “law”; they all refer to the same basic social 
material and way of thinking. After having practised taxonomy on 
a very formal basis and having frequently criticized particular 
taxonomic approaches, including those of David or Zweigert and 
Kötz, I tend, under a radical pluralist’s view of laws, to limit the 
usage of the word “law” in a comparative approach to very near 
that adopted by Samuel. I do not believe that Islam (the only 
“exotic” “law” he refers to indirectly, citing Glenn) has enough in 
common with the law as defined at the end of the previous 
paragraph to be “comparable” with the latter.15 Let me only bring 
back to the attention of the reader three more or less explicit 
definitions of the shari’a by three specialists: a) “The Shari’a is 
the path laid down by the creator; in following it men will find 
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both moral and material well-being. The Shari’a regulates in great 
detail the dealings of individuals with each other and with the 
community; it encompasses all man’s duties to God and his fellow-
men.”16 b) “Floating above Muslim society as a disembodied soul, 
freed from the currents and vicissitudes of time, it represents the 
eternal valid ideal towards which society must aspire.”17 c) “The 
sacred Law of Islam [shari’a] is an all embracing body of religious 
duties, the totality of Allah’s commands that regulate the life of 
every Muslim in all its aspects; it comprises on an equal footing 
ordinances regarding worship and ritual, as well as political and (in 
the narrow sense) legal rules.”18 Would any of these definitions fit 
the one quoted in the above paragraph? Asking the question is 
answering it. This is, of course also true, of what Glenn has absent-
mindedly called “chtonic” legal tradition, providing us with a good 
example of cultural and legal imperialism to which the author quite 
rightly and frequently objects and where I completely share 
Legrand’s views about “alterity” as much as he does.19  
7. Thus, there is no room in Samuel’s theory and method of 
comparisons for space and time beyond the most classical 
theoretical limits of the Western world. This limitation has my 
complete sympathy, because it avoids the indescribable confusion 
which has spread in “legal” science by putting in the same basket 
pre-colonial African, American, Asian or Australasian, without 
forgetting religious laws. The comparative taxonomy, which René 
David fathered from the 1950’s onwards, was in many cases 
unjustifiable whatever method or scheme one adopted. It 
unfortunately necessitated a rag-bag in which to forget whatever 
was left hanging after categorization or, even worse, was 
eliminated from the field of laws and systems, as was the canon 
law of the Catholic Church. Yet, Islamic law, was kept in good 
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place, being admitted that one, in this instance, did not refer to its 
parts kept in force in colonial systems; the latter were an integral 
part of the state system of colonial powers and were denied the 
quality of “Islamic” law by some experts in the field, among them 
Schacht.  
8. Having personally experimented—for better and for worse—
with the space and time dimensions of comparison at the very 
beginning of my research activity when working on a comparative 
history of the concept of code (1954) and African customary laws 
in the field (1959), and when comparing the drafting of customary 
laws in France and the Netherlands from the 15th to the 18th 
century as a teacher, I immediately met the problem of a) defining 
the object of my comparisons and b) transferring notions from one 
language to another, be they African or European. In the former 
was also included the task of deciding where was law, as my 
freshly and poorly acquired legal education had led me to believe it 
laid. I had, of course no real training in anthropology or history. In 
the eyes of Samuel and Legrand, who, happily enough for me, 
were still young, I would have been one of the many who even did 
not figure that a problem of method existed and just went along 
discovering comparison “by gradual trial and error.”20 No wonder 
that, in front of Samuel’s book, I feel like a dinosaur in front of 
Rosetta (not Champollion’s stone, but the latest space vehicle.) 
9. This does not mean that I did not occasionally discover in 
Samuel’s work situations where it would have been most useful by 
opening new windows and qualifications on facts I have met in the 
past. It also means that I could appreciate the connexion between 
some of them and my own attempts at comparing or relativize 
them in the light of an enlarged comparison. Among the latter 
stands the problem of acquiring the basic knowledge required for 
the comparison to take place. Admitting that one cannot ask many 
people to be sufficiently familiar with the language, the law and 
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the social fabric of more than two laws, the consequence of it is 
that apparently not many would qualify as comparatists according 
to Legrand’s requirement, which Samuel seems ready to accept. 
The way he presents it is quite satisfying, but, if it was strictly 
applied, one may wonder how many people would still qualify as 
comparatists, if only at the level of linguistic and cultural 
aptitudes.21 As early as 1985, I was meeting the English word 
“home” and could only escape the immediately realized near-
impossibility of translating the word into French by reference to a 
popular English song.22 In order to go much further, i.e. in 
Japanese law, I was fortunate to have the assistance of a friend and 
colleague who had a doctorate in both law and Far Eastern 
languages. When confronted with the Japanese “honkyo” we 
started with dictionaries: they sent us to the equivalents “tower of a 
castle” and “headquarters of an army.” The possible difference 
between the two appeared in two different translations of the 
Japanese Civil Code, the one into French using the word “siège” 
and the other into English using the word “centre.” Having 
discussed the problem in a conference attended by some Japanese 
colleagues that I presented at the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies of the University of London, no consensus could be 
reached among them as to a definite choice. Beyond the 
dictionaries, I had brought into the picture the military character of 
traditional Japanese society, the partly French, partly German 
education of Japanese lawyers at the time of the drafting of the 
Code, the mittelpunkt (hence centre) dear to Dernburg and in 
conflict with the wording of the B.G.B., etc. Thus, I was exploring 
avenues in the same way that I had been trying to identify the 
sende or the ira in the Zande land tenure system as early as 1959.23 
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But this was apparently not comparative law as Samuel defines it. 
The only positive point could perhaps be that in both cases I was 
decidedly, but perhaps not sufficiently and thus unsuccessfully, 
fighting an automatic direct projection of my own prejudices into 
foreign legal systems. But was I therefore an imperialist in the 
depth of my multiple selves? God, in whom I do not believe, will 
decide on the day of Judgment.  
10. Yet one point still leaves me puzzled. How does one decide 
to subject two notions or concepts to comparison before starting 
the job? The more so as we know and agree that “focusing on 
words and dictionaries is not comparative law.”24 But is it totally 
excluded at the very beginning of a jump into the unknown? When 
René Dekkers launched me on the path of codification, what was I 
looking for? Anything, called in a Romance language, codex, code, 
codice and codigo? This would have provided a very limited 
answer to his concern. The more so as the word had been attributed 
by comparatists and historians to many documents without much 
reflexion as to what it covered. Having read Samuel, I have the 
feeling that I still do not know what was in theory my solution of 
solving the problem by creating a group of “unnamed” codes on 
the basis of a first identification of words found in dictionaries.  
12. Reading Samuel also led me to some introspection 
regarding the reason why one is attracted by the comparison of 
laws, a point which, ultimately is not necessarily of interest for his 
purpose. As mentioned before, I was pushed into it by the hazards 
and necessities of life, and believed that I had entered into 
comparison long before getting my first law degree, as I am sure a 
majority of students are led to believe by their teachers, including 
myself, while studying comparative civil law.  
But what about the objectives of comparison? Going through 
the volume, one finds:  
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– the advancement of knowledge which, as the Author 
understands it, is not only acquiring the knowledge of any law, but 
also exploring beyond the words of the law and going “deeper into 
the histories, sociologies, economics and politics” of the compared 
law.25 This being done, comes: 
– the “access to legal mentalities” which comes from a 
curiosity about the “other” and especially his inner selves, which 
some “critical” or “radical” pluralists (to whose I belong) consider 
to be the place where anything legal, normative or willingly factual 
starts.26 
– the acquisition of a relative look at things legal, including 
one’s own system and, consequently, pushing away any attempt to 
“normatively imposing one’s own epistemological interests on 
others” (citing Jansen, and immediately punctuated by Samuel’s 
“Quite so.”)27 In fact, the comparatist might believe that he has 
become a social anthropologist, which of course is not true. But 
between affirming the interest of acceding to foreign mentalities 
and realizing such objective there is evidently a formidable gap, 
even for an excellent postgraduate student. And, finally: 
– the realization of “a dialectic between the domestic body of 
law and a foreign body of law” in order to give the comparison of 
laws its “meaning and sense”.28 Here comes again the already 
mentioned Legrand’s idea of “alterity” with which I am in full 
sympathy.  
The three objectives just mentioned do not exclude more 
limited ones, of which a characteristic is their relativity. Such is the 
case for the elucidation of information between two laws which 
may have “some practical value”.29 But this is immediately 
discarded, as either, with the support of Sacco, it can “verge on the 
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ridiculous,”30 or, with the support of Legrand, “often be just 
vacuous.”31 Samuel points at the considerable development of the 
discipline in the last twenty years and suggests that the existing 
literature may contribute to a more theory-oriented discipline with 
the risk of a closing itself on itself with the result that “students 
may never actually ever get to compare any laws.”32 
But these are far less contestable objectives than the one which 
is often concealed behind questionable alibis (the need for 
“development” is one of them, which followed the detestable one 
for “civilisation”, both under the rags of “modernisation”): 
imperialism, be it academic, cultural, ideological, intellectual or 
legal.33 Happily enough, the author has no pardon for comparison 
covering such justifications. 
13. All in all, comparison blows up the young lawyer’s mind, 
and I strongly believe that this can be done without too much 
theory or method. As Samuel quite rightly underscores: 
“comparative law, at every level, is by no means easy,”34 the more 
so because if one wishes to enlarge the scope of comparison to 
societies distant in space and time, the scholar is confronted with a 
dramatic lack of the reliable empirical data needed for any 
theoretically valid conclusion. One quickly enters the realm of 
what I call conjectures and hypotheses, which look more “serious” 
than fraud and cunning. But even within such limits the effort is 
worthwhile. As soon as the student gets a glimpse at it, comparison 
gives him the impression of enlarging his perspectives through 
times and spaces as to what law is far away from the canvas he 
often must painfully swallow during his first contacts with law.  
14. Last but not least, a careful reading of Samuel reveals that 
he rarely takes a definite stand on the multiple elements which he 
brings to the attention of his reader; he is, in most cases, satisfied 
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with introducing—is it not precisely what the title of his book 
declares straightaway?—various methods and theories and the pros 
and cons concerning each of them without passing a “judgment” 
on them. Bigotry is evidently not his cup of tea, as it is for some 
imprecators against anything which is not their own conception of 
comparison in the field of law. In a sense, he definitively is a 
pluralist, as he himself emphasizes in the closing lines of his book. 
But does he realize that such commitment has its consequences? If 
he is what I would call a “traditional” pluralist, i.e. those who carry 
on setting pluralism within the State legal structure, there is not 
much problem. However, in the view of critical and radical 
pluralists like Rod Macdonald and me, he has to locate it within 
the infinite variety of individuals’ inner selves, permanently 
defining their own law, in which case he might find that 
comparison is practically impossible as no single mentality is 
comparable to another. This reinforces Legrand’s perspective and 
his suggested characterization of comparison as an intercultural 
dialogue replacing the traditional approach to comparison. But, if 
the author is fundamentally—at least so does he appear to me—a 
pluralist, he cannot discard contemptuously any other approach to 
the comparison of laws. This should enable him to prepare many 
editions of the present capital and most interesting work. 
